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ABSTRACT 
An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G together with, for each 
vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G is popular 
in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any 
matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular 
matching; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily 
computed is the set of dominant matchings. A popular matching M is dominant if M 
wins the head-to-head election against any larger matching. Thus every dominant 
matching is a max-size popular matching and it is known that the set of dominant 
matchings is the linear image of the set of stable matchings in an auxiliary graph. 
Results from the literature seem to suggest that stable and dominant matchings 
behave, from a complexity theory point of view, in a very similar manner within the 
class of popular matchings. 
The goal of this paper is to show that indeed there are differences in the tractability of 
stable and dominant matchings, and to investigate further their importance for 
popular matchings. First, we show that it is easy to check if all popular matchings are 
also stable, however it is co-NP-hard to check if all popular matchings are also 
dominant. Second, we show how some new and recent hardness results on popular 
matching problems can be deduced from the NP-hardness of certain problems on 
stable matchings, also studied in this paper, thus showing that stable matchings can 
be employed not only to show positive results on popular matching (as is known), but 
also most negative ones. Problems for which we show new hardness results include 
finding a min-size (resp. max-size) popular matching that is not stable (resp. 
dominant). A known result for which we give a new and simple proof is the NP-
hardness of finding a popular matching when G is non-bipartite. 
JEL codes: C63, C78 
Keywords: popular matching, NP-completeness, polynomial algorithm, stable 
matching 
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Népszerű párosítások megértése stabil párosítások 
segítségével 
ÁGNES CSEH – YURI FAENZA – TELIKEPALLI KAVITHA  – 
VLADLENA POWERS   
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
Adott egy páros gráf G = (A u B, E), ahol minden csúcs szigorú listában rangsorolja a 
szomszédjait. Egy M párosítást akkor nevezünk népszerűnek, ha nincsen olyan M’ párosítás, 
hogy több csúcs részesíti előnyben M’-t M-mel szemben, mint fordítva.  Minden stabil 
párosítás minimális méretű népszerű párosítás, és egy másik, könnyen kiszámolható 
alosztálya a népszerű párosításoknak az úgynevezett domináns párosítások halmaza. Egy 
népszerű párosítást akkor nevezünk dominánsnak, ha az megnyer minden szavazást egy 
nálánál nagyobb méretű párosítással szemben. Ebből következik, hogy minden domináns 
párosítás egyben legnagyobb méretű népszerű párosítás is. Az is ismert, hogy a domináns 
párosítások megkaphatók egy kibővített input stabil párosításainak a lineáris 
leképezéseiként.  
Cikkünkben megmutatjuk, hogy a stabil és a domináns párosításokkal kapcsolatos 
bonyolultsági eredmények igen különbözőek a két osztályra. Elsőként bebizonyítjuk, hogy 
könnyű ellenőrizni, hogy minden népszerű párosítás stabil-e, viszont coNP-nehéz eldönteni, 
hogy minden népszerű párosítás domináns-e. Ezután bemutatunk néhány NP-teljességi 
bizonyítást népszerű párosításokra, amik stabil párosításokra bizonyított eredményekből 
következnek. Ezzel demonstráljuk, hogy a stabilitásra bizonyított eredmények nemcsak a 
pozitív, de a nehézségi bizonyításokban is hasznosnak bizonyulnak. Az újonnan nehéznek 
besorolt problémák közt megtalálható a legkisebb nem stabil és a legnagyobb nem domináns 
párosítás találása. Népszerű párosítás létezésére nem páros gráfon adunk egy új és egyszerű 
bizonyítást. 
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Abstract. An instance of the marriage problem is given by a graph G = (A∪B,E), together
with, for each vertex of G, a strict preference order over its neighbors. A matching M of G
is popular in the marriage instance if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any
matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching;
another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily computed is the
set of dominant matchings. A popular matching M is dominant if M wins the head-to-head
election against any larger matching. Thus every dominant matching is a max-size popular
matching and it is known that the set of dominant matchings is the linear image of the set of
stable matchings in an auxiliary graph. Results from the literature seem to suggest that stable
and dominant matchings behave, from a complexity theory point of view, in a very similar
manner within the class of popular matchings.
The goal of this paper is to show that indeed there are differences in the tractability of stable
and dominant matchings, and to investigate further their importance for popular matchings.
First, we show that it is easy to check if all popular matchings are also stable, however it is
co-NP hard to check if all popular matchings are also dominant. Second, we show how some
new and recent hardness results on popular matching problems can be deduced from the NP-
hardness of certain problems on stable matchings, also studied in this paper, thus showing that
stable matchings can be employed not only to show positive results on popular matching (as is
known), but also most negative ones. Problems for which we show new hardness results include
finding a min-size (resp. max-size) popular matching that is not stable (resp. dominant). A
known result for which we give a new and simple proof is the NP-hardness of finding a popular
matching when G is non-bipartite.
1 Introduction
Consider a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E) on n vertices and m edges where each vertex has a strict
ranking of its neighbors. Such a graph supplied with preference lists, also called a marriage instance,
is an extensively studied model in two-sided matching markets. The problem of computing a stable
matching in G is classical. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to M ,
i.e., an edge whose endpoints prefer each other to their respective assignments in M . The notion of
stability was introduced by Gale and Shapley [11] in 1962 who showed that stable matchings always
exist in G and there is a simple linear time algorithm to find one.
Stable matchings in an instance with an underlying bipartite graph G are well-understood [14],
with efficient algorithms [19, 27, 9, 24, 10, 26] to solve several optimization problems that have many
applications in economics, computer science, and mathematics. Here we study a related and more
relaxed notion called popularity. This notion was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [12] in 1975 who showed
that every stable matching is also popular. For any vertex u, its preference over neighbors extends
naturally to a preference over matchings as follows: u prefers M to M ′ either if (i) u is matched in
M and unmatched in M ′ or (ii) u is matched in both and prefers its partner in M to its partner
in M ′. Let ψ(M,M ′) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M ′.
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if ψ(M,M ′) ≥ ψ(M ′,M) for every matching M ′ in G,
i.e., ∆(M,M ′) ≥ 0 where ∆(M,M ′) = ψ(M,M ′)− ψ(M ′,M).
? Work done while visiting Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Informatik, Saarbru¨cken, Germany.
Hence, in a voting-based context, vertices constitute the set of voters, and each matching in the
instance is an alternative. In a head-to-head election between two matchings, each vertex casts a
vote for the matching that it prefers and it abstains from voting if its assignment is the same in
both matchings. A popular matching, by definition, never loses such a head-to-head election against
another matching. Hence, a popular matching is a weak Condorcet winner [3, 4] in the corresponding
voting instance. It is easy to show that a stable matching is a min-size popular matching [16]. Thus
larger matchings and more generally, matchings that achieve more social good, are possible by
relaxing the constraint of stability to popularity.
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings in bipartite graphs have been well-studied in the
last decade [2, 16, 20, 21, 17, 6, 8]. We currently know efficient algorithms for the following problems
in bipartite graphs: (i) min-size popular matchings, (ii) max-size popular matchings, and (iii) finding
a popular matching with a given edge. All these algorithms compute either a stable matching or a
dominant matching.
Definition 2. A popular matching M is dominant in G if M is more popular than any larger
matching in G, i.e., ∆(M,M ′) > 0 for any matching M ′ such that |M ′| > |M |.
Thus a dominant matching defeats every larger matching in a head-to-head election, so it imme-
diately follows that a dominant matching is a popular matching of maximum size. The example in
Fig. 1 (from [16]) demonstrates the differences between stable, dominant, and max-size matchings.
In the graph G = (A ∪ B,E) here, we have A = {a1, a2, a3} and B = {b1, b2, b3}. The same
preferences are depicted as numbers on the edges and as lists to the left of the drawn graph. Vertex
b1 is the top choice for all ai’s, b2 is the second choice for a1 and a2, and b3 is the third choice for a1
alone. The preference lists of the bi vertices are symmetric. There are two popular matchings here,
both of them have the same cardinality: M1 = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)} and M2 = {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)}.
The matching M1 is stable, but not dominant, since it is not more popular than the larger
matching M3 = {(a1, b3), (a2, b2), (a3, b1)}. Observe that in an election between M1 and M3, the
vertices a1, b1 vote for M1, the vertices a3, b3 vote for M3, and the vertices a2, b2 are indifferent
between M1 and M3; thus ∆(M1,M3) = 2− 2 = 0. The matching M2 is dominant since M2 is more
popular than M3: observe that ∆(M2,M3) = 4 − 2 = 2 since a1, b1, a2, b2 prefer M2 to M3 while
a3, b3 prefer M3 to M2. However M2 is not stable, since (a1, b1) blocks it.
a1 : b1  b2  b3 b1 : a1  a2  a3
a2 : b1  b2 b2 : a1  a2
a3 : b1 b3 : a1
a1
b2
b1
a2
b3 a3
2
1
1 13
22
1
2
3
Fig. 1. The above instance admits two popular matchings. The stable matching M1 is marked by dotted
red edges, while the dominant matching M2 is marked by dashed green edges.
Dominant matchings always exist in a bipartite graph [16] and a dominant matching can be
computed in linear time [20]. Moreover, dominant matchings are the linear image of stable matchings
in an auxiliary instance [6], hence oftentimes an optimization problem over the set of dominant
matchings (e.g. finding one of maximum weight) boils down to solving the same problem on the set
of stable matchings. Very recently, the following rather surprising result was shown [8]: it is NP-hard
to decide if a bipartite graph admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant.
1.1 Our problems, results, and techniques
Everything known so far about stable and dominant matchings seemed to suggest that those classes
play somehow symmetric roles in popular matching problems in bipartite graphs: both classes are
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always non-empty and one is a tractable subclass of min-size popular matchings while the other is a
tractable subclass of max-size popular matchings. Our first set of results shows that this symmetry
is not always the case.
Our starting point is an investigation of the complexity of the following two natural and easy-
to-ask questions on popular matchings in a bipartite graph G with strict preference lists:
(1) is every popular matching in G also stable?
(2) is every popular matching in G also dominant?
Both these questions are trivial to answer in instances that admit popular matchings of more
than one size. Then the answer to both questions is “no” since {dominant matchings} ∩ {stable
matchings} = ∅ in such graphs as dominant matchings are max-size popular matchings while stable
matchings are min-size popular matchings. Thus, in this case, a dominant matching is an unstable
popular matching and a stable matching is a non-dominant popular matching in G. However, when
all popular matchings in G have the same size, these questions are non-trivial.
Moreover, it is useful to ask these questions because when there are edge utilities, the problem
of finding a max-utility popular matching is NP-hard in general [22] and also hard to approximate
to a factor better than 2 [8]; however if every popular matching is stable (similarly, dominant), then
the max-utility popular matching problem can be solved in polynomial time. Thus a “yes” answer
to either of these questions has applications. We show the following dichotomy here: though both
these questions seem analogous, only one is easy-to-answer.
(∗) There is an O(m2) algorithm to decide if every popular matching in G = (A ∪ B,E) is stable,
however it is co-NP complete to decide if every popular matching in G = (A∪B,E) is dominant.
The first step in proving (∗) is to show that questions (1) and (2) are equivalent to the following:4
(1′) is every dominant matching in G also stable?
(2′) is every stable matching in G also dominant?
In Section 3, we give a combinatorial algorithm that solves (1′) in time O(m2). We settle the
complexity of (2) and (2′) in Section 4, showing that the problem is co-NP hard. We deduce the
latter from the hardness of finding a stable matching with a certain augmenting path: a result that
is shown in this paper.
Our hardness reduction is surprisingly simple when compared to those that appeared in recent
publications on popular matchings [8, 13, 22], and establishes a new connection between hardness
of problems for stable matchings and hardness of problems for popular matchings. This connection
turns out to be very fertile: we exploit it further to show NP-hardness of the following new deci-
sion problems for a bipartite graph G (in particular, these hardness results are not implied by the
reductions from [8, 13, 22]):
(3) is there a stable matching in G that is dominant?
(4) is there a max-size popular matching in G that is not dominant?
(5) is there a min-size popular matching in G that is not stable?
A general graph (not necessarily bipartite) with strict preference lists is called a roommates
instance. Popular matchings need not always exist in a roommates instance and the popular room-
mates problem is to decide if a given instance admits one or not. The complexity of the popular
roommates problem was open for close to a decade and very recently, two independent proofs of
NP-hardness [8, 13] of this problem were shown. Both these proofs are rather lengthy and technical.
We use the hardness result for problem (3) to show a short and simple proof of NP-hardness
of the popular roommates problem. Moreover, the hardness result for (5) shows an alternative and
much simpler proof of NP-hardness (compared to [8]) of the following decision problem in a marriage
4 Although similar in spirit, the arguments leading from (1) to (1′) and from (2) to (2′) are not the same,
see Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
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instance G = (A∪B,E) equipped with strict preference lists: is there a popular matching in G that
is neither stable nor dominant?5
Algorithms for computing min-size/max-size popular matchings and for the popular edge prob-
lem compute either stable matchings or dominant matchings. Dominant matchings in G are stable
matchings in a related graph G′ (see Section 2) and so the machinery of stable matchings is used
to solve dominant matching problems. Thus all positive results in the domain of popular matchings
can be attributed to stable matchings. Conversely, all hardness results proved in this paper rely on
the fact that it is hard to find stable matchings that have / do not have certain augmenting paths.
Hence, properties of stable matchings are also responsible for, and provide a unified approach to,
the hardness of many popular matching problems.
1.2 Background and related results
In all problems considered in this paper, all vertices of a graph have strict preference lists over their
neighbors. The first algorithmic question studied in the domain of popular matchings was in the
one-sided preference lists model in bipartite graphs: here, unlike in our setting, one side of the graph
consists of agents who have preferences over their neighbors while vertices on the other side are
objects with no preferences. Popular matchings need not always exist here and an efficient algorithm
was shown in [1] to determine if one exists or not.
Popular matchings always exist in bipartite graphs when every vertex has a strict preference
list [12]. However when preference lists are not strict, the problem of deciding if a popular match-
ing exists or not is NP-hard [2, 5]. The first non-trivial algorithms designed for computing popular
matchings in bipartite graphs with strict preference lists were the max-size popular matching al-
gorithms [16, 20]. These algorithms compute dominant matchings and the term dominant matching
was formally defined a few years later in [6] to solve the “popular edge” problem.
As mentioned earlier, it was recently shown that it is NP-hard to decide if a marriage instance
admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant [8]. This hardness result was shown
by a reduction from 1-in-3 SAT and a consequence of this hardness result was the hardness of the
popular roommates problem. The NP-hardness of popular roommates problem shown in [13] was by
a reduction from a problem called the partitioned vertex cover problem.
There are several efficient algorithms to solve the stable roommates problem [18, 25, 26]. In con-
trast, the dominant roommates problem, i.e., the problem of deciding whether a roommates instance
admits a dominant matching or not, is NP-hard [8]. Our NP-hardness proof of the popular room-
mates problem also proves the hardness of the dominant roommates problem and it is much simpler
than the proof in [8].
Organization of the paper. Section 2 contains known facts on popular, stable, and dominant match-
ings, that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we present an algorithm to decide if
G has an unstable popular matching. Section 4 has our co-NP hardness result, which is deduced
from the problem of deciding whether stable matchings with certain augmenting paths exist, whose
hardness is also proved in Section 4. In Section 5 we show how the problem of deciding whether a
stable matching without certain augmenting paths exists implies new and known hardness results,
in particular the hardness of deciding if there exists a matching that is both stable and dominant.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (A ∪ B,E) be the graph in our input. We will often refer to vertices in A and B as men
and women, respectively. We will always assume that each vertex has a strict preference order over
his/her neighbors, and the set of these lists is denoted by P. An instance of our problem consists
of G and P, but we will omit to explicitly mention P when it is clear from the context. We often
5 The reduction in [8] also showed that it was NP-hard to decide if G admits a popular matching that is
neither a min-size nor a max-size popular matching. Our reduction does not imply this.
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abbreviate n = |A ∪ B| and m = |E|. We now sketch four important tools developed for popular
matchings in earlier papers. Each of these will be used in later parts of this paper.
1) Characterization of popular matchings. Let M be any matching in G. For any edge (a, b) /∈
M , define votea(b,M) as follows (here M(a) is a’s partner in the matching M and M(a) = null if a
is unmatched in M):
votea(b,M) =
{
+ if a prefers b to M(a);
− if a prefers M(a) to b.
We can similarly define voteb(a,M). Label every edge (a, b) /∈ M by (votea(b,M), voteb(a,M)).
Thus every edge outside M has a label in {(±,±)}. Note that an edge e is labeled (+,+) if and only
if e is a blocking edge to M .
Let GM be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edges labeled (−,−) from G. The following
theorem characterizes popular matchings. This characterization holds in non-bipartite graphs as
well.
Theorem 1 ([16]). Matching M is popular in instance G,P if and only if GM does not contain
any of the following with respect to M :
(i) an alternating cycle with a (+,+) edge;
(ii) an alternating path with two distinct (+,+) edges;
(iii) an alternating path with a (+,+) edge and an unmatched vertex as an endpoint.
The following theorem characterizes dominant matchings.
Theorem 2 ([6]). A popular matching M is dominant iff there is no M -augmenting path in GM .
2) The graph G′. Dominant matchings in G are equivalent to stable matchings in a related graph
G′: this equivalence was first used in [6], later simplified in [8]. The graph G′ is the bidirected graph
corresponding to G. The vertex set of G′ is the same as the vertex set A ∪ B of G and every edge
(a, b) in G is replaced by 2 edges in G′: one directed from a to b denoted by (a+, b−) and the other
directed from b to a denoted by (a−, b+). Let u ∈ A∪B and suppose v1  v2 · · ·  vk is u’s preference
order in G. Then u’s preference order in G′ is:
v−1  v−2 · · ·  v−k  v+1  v+2 · · ·  v+k .
That is, every vertex prefers outgoing edges to incoming edges and among outgoing edges, it
maintains its original preference order and among incoming edges, it maintains again its original
preference order. Observe that vertex preferences in G′ are expressed on incident edges rather than
on neighbors. However it is easy to see that stable matchings in G′ are equivalent to stable matchings
in the following conventional graph that has 3 vertices u+, u−, d(u) corresponding to each vertex
u in G′. The preference order of u+ is v−1  v−2 · · ·  v−k  d(u), the preference order of u− is
d(u)  v+1  v+2 · · ·  v+k , and the preference order of d(u) is u+  u−.
It was shown in [6, 8] that any stable matching M ′ in G′ projects to a dominant matching M
in G by setting (a, b) ∈ M if and only if either (a+, b−) or (a−, b+) is in M ′, and conversely, any
dominant matching in G can be realized as a stable matching in G′.
3) The set of matched vertices. We will be using the Rural Hospitals Theorem for stable match-
ings (see e.g. [14]) that states that all stable matchings in G match the same subset of vertices. Note
that every dominant matching in G matches the same subset of vertices (via the Rural Hospitals
Theorem for stable matchings in G′). More generally, the following fact is true, where V (N) is the
set of vertices matched in a matching N .
Lemma 1 ([15, 16]). Let S be a stable, M be a popular, and D be a dominant matching in a
marriage instance G = (A ∪B,E),P. Then V (S) ⊆ V (M) ⊆ V (D).
5
Thus, in particular, in instances where stable matchings have the same size as dominant match-
ings, all popular matchings match the same subset of vertices.
4) Witness of a popular matching. Let G˜ be the graph G augmented with self-loops. That is,
we assume each vertex is its own last choice neighbor. So we can henceforth regard any matching
M in G as a perfect matching M˜ in G˜ by including self-loops at all vertices left unmatched in M .
The following edge weight function wtM in G˜ will be useful to us. For any edge (a, b) in G, define:
wtM (a, b) =

2 if (a, b) is labeled (+,+)
−2 if (a, b) is labeled (−,−)
0 otherwise.
We need to define wtM for self-loops as well: let wtM (u, u) = 0 if u is matched to itself in M˜ ,
else wtM (u, u) = −1. For any matching N in G, it is easy to see that wtM (N˜) = ∆(N,M) and so M
is popular in G if and only if every perfect matching in G˜ has weight at most 0. Theorem 3 follows
from LP-duality and the fact that G is a bipartite graph.
Theorem 3 ([23, 21]). A matching M in G = (A ∪ B,E),P is popular if and only if there exists
a vector α ∈ {0,±1}n such that ∑u∈A∪B αu = 0,
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E and αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
For any popular matching M , a vector α as given in Theorem 3 will be called M ’s witness or
dual certificate. A popular matching may have several witnesses. Any stable matching has 0 as a
witness.
Call an edge e popular if there is a popular matching in G that contains e. For any popular edge
(a, b), it was shown in [7] (using complementary slackness) that αa + αb = wtM (a, b). This will be a
useful fact for us. Another useful fact from [7] (again by complementary slackness) is that if vertex
u is left unmatched in some popular matching then αu = wtM (u, u) for every popular matching M ;
thus αu = 0 if u is left unmatched in M , else αu = −1.
We now illustrate each of the above four tools on our example instance G,P from Fig. 1.
1) Recall the matching M1 = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)}. We will test if M1 is popular/dominant using
Theorems 1 and 2. First we label each edge (a, b) not in M1 by (votea(b,M1(a)), voteb(a,M1(b))),
see Fig.2. Since no edge is labeled (−,−), the subgraph GM1 = G. Observe that GM1 has no
forbidden alternating path/cycle as given in Theorem 1. Thus M1 is popular. However there is
an M1-augmenting path 〈b3, a1, b1, a3〉 in GM1 , so M1 is not dominant (by Theorem 2).
a1
b2
b1
a2
b3 a3
2
(+
,−
)
1
1 13
(+,−)
22
1 (
+
,−
)2
3
(−,+)
Fig. 2. Edge labels with respect to M1 = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)}.
2) The bidirected graph G′ corresponding to G is given in Fig. 3. Observe that in the trans-
formed set of preference lists, each vertex ranks its outgoing edges in their original order, fol-
lowed by the incoming copies of the same edges in their original order. The only stable match-
ing in G′ is {(a+1 , b−2 ), (a−2 , b+1 )} (marked by dashed green edges in Fig. 3) and it projects to
M2 = {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)}—this is the only dominant matching in G.
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a1 : b−1  b−2  b−3  b+1  b+2  b+3
a2 : b−1  b−2  b+1  b+2
a3 : b−1  b31
b1 : a−1  a−2  a−3  a+1  a+2  a+3
b2 : a−1  a−2  a+1  a+2
b3 : a−1  a+1
a1
b2
b1
a2
b3 a3
2
3
2
3
5
1
5
1
1 4 3 21 6
2 4
32 14 16
24
Fig. 3. The bidirected graph G′ corresponding to G, and the transformed lists.
3) The set of matched vertices is the same for all popular matchings in the above instance: V (M1) =
V (M2) = {(a1, a2, b1, b2}.
4) We will construct a witness α for M2, see Fig. 4. So α ∈ {0,±1}6. Since M2 leaves a3 and
b3 unmatched, it has to be the case that αa3 = αb3 = 0. We also know that αa1 = αb1 = 1
because αa1 + αb1 ≥ wtM2(a1, b1) = 2. Since
∑
u∈A∪B αu = 0, the only possibility for the
remaining two vertices is αa2 = αb2 = −1. We have αu ≥ wtM2(u, u) for all vertices u since
wtM2(a3, a3) = wtM2(b3, b3) = 0 and wtM2(v, v) = −1 for other vertices v.
Observe that αa1 + αb3 = 1 > 0 = wtM2(a1, b3) and αa3 + αb1 = 1 > 0 = wtM2(a3, b1). For
the remaining 4 edges, the corresponding constraint is tight. That is, αa + αb = wtM2(a, b) for
a ∈ {a1, a2} and b ∈ {b1, b2}.
a1
1
b2
−1
b1
1
a2
−1
b3
0
a3
0
2
1
1 13
22
1
2
3
Fig. 4. A witness α constructed for M2 = {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)} is denoted by the red labels next to the vertices.
3 Finding an unstable popular matching
We are given G = (A∪B,E) with strict preference lists and the problem is to decide if every popular
matching in G is also stable, i.e., if {popular matchings} = {stable matchings} or not in G. In this
section we show an efficient algorithm to answer this question.
Problem 1 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is an unstable popular matching in G.
Let G admit an unstable popular matching M and let α ∈ {0,±1}n be M ’s witness. Let A0 be
the set of vertices a ∈ A with αa = 0 and let B0 be the set of vertices b ∈ B with αb = 0.
Let M0 be the set of edges (a, b) ∈ M such that αa = αb = 0. Let M1 be the set of edges
(a, b) ∈ M such that αa, αb ∈ {±1}. Note that M = M0 ·∪M1, since the parities of αa and αb have
to be the same for any popular edge due to the tightness of the constraint αa +αb = wtM (a, b) = 0.
The construction can be followed in Fig. 5. A\A0 has been further split into A1∪A−1: A1 is the
set of those vertices a with αa = 1 and A−1 is the set of those vertices a with αa = −1; similarly,
B \ B0 has been further split into B1 ∪ B−1: B1 is the set of those vertices b with αb = 1 and B−1
is the set of those vertices b with αb = −1. We have M1 ⊆ (A1 × B−1) ∪ (A−1 × B1) since for any
edge (a, b) in M , we have αa + αb = wtM (a, b) = 0.
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A−1
A1
B1
B−1
B0A0
Fig. 5. M0 is the matching M restricted to vertices in A0 ∪ B0 and M1 is the matching M restricted to
remaining vertices.
Now we run a transformation M0 ; D as given in [6]: let G0 be the graph G restricted to A0∪B0.
Run Gale-Shapley algorithm in the graph G′0 with the starting matching M ′0 = {(u+, v−) : (u, v) ∈
M0 and u ∈ A0, v ∈ B0}, where G′0 is the graph obtained from G0 as described in Section 2. That
is, instead of starting with the empty matching, we start with the matching M ′0 in G′0; unmatched
men in A0 propose in decreasing order of preference and whenever a woman receives a proposal from
a neighbor that she prefers to her current partner (her preferences as given in G′0), she rejects her
current partner and accepts this proposal. This results in a stable matching in G′0, equivalently, a
dominant matching D in G0, see Section 2. It was moreover shown in [6] that M∗ = M1 ∪ D is a
dominant matching in G. We include a new and much simpler proof of this fact below.
Claim 1 The matching M∗ = M1 ∪D is dominant in G.
Proof. The dominant matching D was obtained as the linear image of a stable matching (call it D′)
in G′0. Let A′1 be the set of a ∈ A0 such that (a+, b−) ∈ D′ for some b ∈ B0 and A′−1 = A0 \ A′1.
Similarly, let B′1 be the set of b ∈ B0 such that (a−, b+) ∈ D′ for some a ∈ A0 and B′−1 = B0 \ B′1.
See Fig. 6.
A1
A−1 B1
B−1
A′−1 B
′
1
B′−1A
′
1
Fig. 6. We transformed the stable matching M0 on A0 ∪B0 to the dominant matching D: this partitions A0
into A′1 ∪A′−1 and B0 into B′1 ∪B′−1. We also have A \A0 = A1 ∪A−1 and B \B0 = B1 ∪B−1.
Observe that every vertex in A′1 ∪ B′1 is matched in D, however not every vertex in A′−1 ∪ B′−1
is necessarily matched in D. That is, A′−1 ∪B′−1 may contain unmatched vertices.
The popular matching M has a witness α ∈ {0,±1}n: recall that this was the witness used to
partition A ∪ B into A0 ∪ B0 and (A \ A0) ∪ (B \ B0). We have αu = 0 for all u ∈ A0 ∪ B0 and
αu ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ (A \A0) ∪ (B \B0).
In order to prove the popularity of M∗ = M1 ∪ D, we will show a witness β as follows. For
the vertices outside A0 ∪ B0, set βu = αu since nothing has changed for these vertices in the
transformation M ;M∗. For the vertices in A0 ∪B0, set βu = 1 for u ∈ A′1 ∪B′1 and βu = −1 for
every matched vertex u ∈ A′−1 ∪B′−1. For every unmatched vertex u, set βu = 0.
8
Thus βu ≥ wtM∗(u, u) for all u and
∑
u:A∪B βu = 0: this is because D ⊆ (A′1×B′−1)∪(A′−1×B′1),
so for every edge (a, b) ∈ D, we have βa + βb = 0; recall that αa + αb = 0 for all (a, b) ∈M1. What
is left to show is that βa + βb ≥ wtM∗(a, b) for every edge (a, b).
The correctness of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in G′0 to compute popular matchings in G0 im-
mediately implies that every edge with both endpoints in A0 ∪B0 is covered by the sum of β-values
of its endpoints (see [8]). We will now show that every edge with one endpoint in A0 ∪ B0 and the
other endpoint in (A \A0) ∪ (B \B0) is also covered.
– Every edge in A′1×B1 is covered since βa+βb = 2 ≥ wtM∗(a, b). Similarly every edge in A1×B′1
is also covered.
– Consider any edge (a, b) ∈ A′1 ×B−1. We have αa = 0 and αb = −1 and so wtM (a, b) ≤ −1, i.e.,
wtM (a, b) = −2 since this is a value in {0,±2}. This means b prefers M(b) = M∗(b) to a. Thus
wtM∗(a, b) ≤ 0. Since βa = 1 and βb = −1, we have βa + βb ≥ wtM∗(a, b). Similarly every edge
in A−1 ×B′1 is also covered.
– Consider any edge (a, b) in A−1 ×B′−1. We have wtM (a, b) ≤ −1 which means that wtM (a, b) =
−2. That is, both a and b prefer their partners in M to each other. We will now show that
wtM∗(a, b) = −2. Since M(a) = M∗(a), nothing has changed for a and so a prefers M∗(a) to b.
We claim that M∗(b) b M(b), i.e., b is no worse in M∗ than in M .
This is because we ran Gale-Shapley algorithm in G′0 with M ′0 as the starting matching. So if
b ∈ B′−1 changed its partner from u+ in M ′0 to v+ in D′ then b prefers v to u. Thus every b ∈ B′−1
has at least as good a partner in D as in M0. Hence wtM∗(a, b) = −2 = βa + βb. By the same
reasoning, we can argue that every edge in A1 ×B′−1 is also covered.
– Consider any edge (a, b) in A′−1 × B−1. We have αa = 0 and αb = −1 and so wtM (a, b) ≤ −1,
i.e., wtM (a, b) = −2. So b prefers M(b) = M∗(b) to a. We claim that M∗(a) a M(a). This will
imply that wtM∗(a, b) = −2.
Recall that D′ is a stable matching in G′0: here every vertex prefers outgoing edges to incoming
edges, thus every a ∈ A′−1 gets at least as good a partner as S∗(a) in D, where S∗ is the men-
optimal stable matching in G0; in turn, S∗(a) a M0(a) for all a ∈ A. Hence M∗(a) a M(a)
for every a ∈ A′−1. Thus wtM∗(a, b) = −2 = βa + βb. We can similarly show that every edge in
A′−1 ×B1 is also covered.
Thus M∗ is a popular matching in G. We will now show that M∗ is a dominant matching
in G. Observe that βu ∈ {±1} for every matched vertex u: we will use this fact to show that M∗ is
dominant. Recall that βu = 0 for all unmatched vertices u. Let ρ = 〈a0, b1, a1, . . . , bk, ak, bk+1〉 be any
M∗-augmenting path in G. We have βa0 = βbk+1 = 0, hence βb1 = βak = 1, and so βa1 = βbk = −1.
Either (i) βb2 = −1 or (ii) βb2 = 1 which implies that βa2 = −1. It is now easy to see that in the
path ρ, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the edge (ai, bi+1) has to be labeled (−,−). That is, ρ is not an
augmenting path in GM∗ . Thus there is no M∗-augmenting path in GM∗ , hence M∗ is a dominant
matching in G (by Theorem 2). uunionsq
Since M is an unstable matching, there is an edge (a, b) that blocks M . Since wtM (a, b) = 2, the
endpoints of a blocking edge (a, b) have to satisfy αa = αb = 1; so a ∈ A1 and b ∈ B1. The edge
(a, b) blocks M∗ as well since the matching M1 was unchanged by this transformation of M0 to D,
so M∗(a) = M1(a) and M∗(b) = M1(b), thus a and b prefer each other to their respective partners
in M∗. So M∗ is an unstable dominant matching and Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2. If G,P has an unstable popular matching then G,P admits an unstable dominant match-
ing.
Hence in order to answer the question of whether every popular matching in G is stable or not,
we need to decide if there exists a dominant matching M in G with a blocking edge. We present a
simple combinatorial algorithm for this problem.
Our algorithm is based on the equivalence between dominant matchings in G and stable match-
ings in G′. Our task is to determine if there exists a stable matching in G′ that includes a pair of
edges (a+, v−) and (u−, b+) such that a and b prefer each other to v and u, respectively, in G. It is
easy to decide in O(m3) time whether such a stable matching exists or not in G′.
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– For every pair of edges e1 = (a, v) and e2 = (u, b) in G such that a and b prefer each other to v
and u, respectively: determine if there is a stable matching in G′ that contains the pair of edges
(a+, v−) and (u−, b+).
In the graph G′, we modify Gale-Shapley algorithm so that b rejects proposals from all neighbors
ranked worse than u− and v rejects all proposals from neighbors ranked worse than a+. If the
resulting algorithm returns a stable matching that contains the edges (a+, v−) and (u−, b+), then
we have the desired matching; else G′ has no stable matching that contains this particular pair of
edges.
In order to determine if there exists an unstable dominant matching, we may need to go through
all pairs of edges (e1, e2) ∈ E × E. Since we can determine in linear time if there exists a stable
matching in G′ with any particular pair of edges [14], the running time of this algorithm is O(m3).
A faster algorithm. It is easy to improve the running time to O(m2). For each (a, b) ∈ E we check
the following.
(◦) Does there exist a stable matching in G′ such that (1) a+ is matched to a neighbor that is ranked
worse than b− in a’s list, and (2) b+ is matched to a neighbor that is ranked worse than a− in
b’s list?
We modify the Gale-Shapley algorithm in G′ so that (1) b rejects all offers from superscript +
neighbors, i.e., b accepts proposals only from superscript − neighbors, and (2) every neighbor of a
that is ranked better than b− rejects proposals from a+.
Suppose (◦) holds. Then this modified Gale-Shapley algorithm returns among all such stable
matchings, the most men-optimal and women-pessimal one [14]. Thus among all stable matchings
that match a+ to a neighbor ranked worse than b− and that include some edge (∗, b+), the matching
returned by the above algorithm matches b to its least preferred neighbor and a to its most preferred
neighbor.
Hence if the modified Gale-Shapley algorithm returns a matching that is (i) unstable or (ii) in-
cludes an edge (a−, ∗) or (iii) matches b+ to a neighbor better than a−, then there is no dominant
matching M in G such that the pair (a, b) blocks M . Else we have the desired stable matching in
G′, call this matching M ′.
The projection of the matching M ′ on to the edge set of G will be a dominant matching in G
with (a, b) as a blocking edge. Since we may need to go through all edges in E and the time taken
for any edge (a, b) is O(m), the entire running time of this algorithm is O(m2). We have thus shown
the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given G = (A ∪ B,E) on m edges and strict preference lists of its vertices, we can
decide in O(m2) time whether every popular matching in G is stable or not; if not, we can return
an unstable popular matching.
4 Finding a non-dominant popular matching
Given an instance G = (A ∪ B,E),P, the problem we consider here is to decide if every popular
matching is also dominant, i.e., to decide if {popular matchings} = {dominant matchings} or not
in G.
Problem 2 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is a non-dominant popular matching in G.
In this section, we show the following.
Theorem 5. Given G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preference lists, it is NP-complete to decide if G
admits a popular matching that is not dominant.
We start with the following lemma, that is the counterpart of Lemma 2.
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Lemma 3. If G,P has a non-dominant popular matching M then G,P admits a non-dominant
stable matching N . If M is given, then N can be found efficiently.
Proof. Let M be a non-dominant popular matching in G and α ∈ {0,±1}n its witness (see Theo-
rem 3). We will use the decomposition illustrated in Fig. 5 to show the existence of a non-dominant
stable matching in G. As per the decomposition in Fig. 5, M = M0 ·∪M1. Since M is not dominant,
there exists an M -augmenting path ρ in GM (by Theorem 2). The endpoints of ρ (call them u and v)
are unmatched in M , hence αu = αv = 0 (see Section 2) and so u and v are in A0 ∪B0.
In the graph GM , the vertices in B−1 ∪ A−1 (these vertices have α-value −1) are adjacent only
to vertices in A1 ∪ B1 as all other edges incident to vertices in B−1 ∪ A−1 are labeled (−,−), and
these are not present in GM . Suppose the M -alternating path ρ leaves the vertex set A0 ∪ B0, i.e.,
suppose it contains a non-matching edge between A0∪B0 and A1∪B1. Since the partners of vertices
in A1 ∪ B1 are in B−1 ∪ A−1, the path ρ can never return to A0 ∪ B0. However we know that the
last vertex v of ρ is in A0 ∪ B0. Thus ρ never leaves A0 ∪ B0, i.e., ρ is an M0-augmenting path in
G∗M0 , where G
∗ is the graph G restricted to vertices in A0 ∪B0.
We now run a transformation M1 ; S as given in [6] to convert M1 into a stable matching S as
follows. The matching S is obtained by running Gale-Shapley algorithm in the subgraph G1, which is
the graph G restricted to (A\A0)∪(B\B0): however, rather than starting with the empty matching,
we start with the matching given by M1 ∩ (A−1 ×B1). So unmatched men (these are vertices in A1
to begin with) propose in decreasing order of preference and whenever a woman receives a proposal
from a neighbor that she prefers to her current partner (her preferences as given in G), she rejects
her current partner and accepts this proposal. This results in a stable matching S in G1.
It was shown in [6] that N = M0 ∪ S is a stable matching in G. We include a new and simple
proof of this below (see Claim 2). Since ρ is an M0-augmenting path in G∗M0 and M0 is a subset of
N , it follows that ρ is an N -augmenting path in GN . Thus N is a non-dominant stable matching
in G. uunionsq
Claim 2 The matching N = M0 ∪ S is a stable matching in G.
Proof. The matching S is obtained by running Gale-Shapley algorithm in the graph G1 on vertex
set (A \A0)∪ (B \B0). We did not compute the matching S from scratch — we started with edges
of the matching M1 restricted to A−1 × B1. So in the resulting matching S, it is easy to see the
following two useful properties:
– S(b) b M1(b) for every b ∈ B1. This is because to begin with, every b ∈ B1 is matched to M1(b)
and b will change her partner only if she receives a proposal from a neighbor better than M1(b).
– S(a) a M1(a) for every a ∈ A1. This is because all vertices in B−1 are unmatched in our
starting matching and every b ∈ B−1 prefers her partner in M1 to any neighbor in A−1 (since
every edge in A−1 ×B−1 is labeled (−,−) with respect to M1). Thus in the matching S, a will
get accepted either by M1(a) or a better neighbor.
It is now easy to show that N is a stable matching. We already know that M0 is a stable matching
on A0 ∪B0 and S is a stable matching on (A \A0) ∪ (B \B0). It is left to show that no edge (a, b)
with one endpoint in A0 ∪ B0 and another endpoint in (A \ A0) ∪ (B \ B0) blocks N , i.e., we need
to show that wtN (a, b) ≤ 0 for every such edge (a, b).
Suppose a ∈ A0 and b ∈ B−1. Let α be the witness of M used to partition A ∪ B into A0 ∪ B0
and (A \A0) ∪ (B \B0). So αa = 0 and αb = −1, hence wtM (a, b) ≤ −1, i.e., wtM (a, b) = −2. Thus
a prefers M0(a) = N(a) to b. Hence wtN (a, b) ≤ 0. We can similarly show that wtN (a, b) ≤ 0 for
a ∈ A−1 and b ∈ B0.
Suppose a ∈ A0 and b ∈ B1. Then αa = 0 and αb = 1 and so wtM (a, b) ≤ 1, i.e., wtM (a, b) ≤ 0.
So if a prefers M0(a) = N(a) to b then we can immediately conclude that wtN (a, b) ≤ 0. Else b
prefers M1(b) to a and we have noted above that S(b) b M1(b) for every b ∈ B1. Thus b prefers
N(b) = S(b) to a and so wtN (a, b) ≤ 0. We can similarly argue that wtN (a, b) ≤ 0 for every a ∈ A1
and b ∈ B0. This finishes the proof of this claim. uunionsq
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Our problem now is to decide if there exists a non-dominant stable matching N in G, i.e., a
stable matching N with an N -augmenting path in GN (see Theorem 2). We show a reduction from
3SAT. Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform φ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm as follows: let X1, . . . , Xn be the
n variables in φ. For each i:
– replace all occurrences of ¬Xi in φ with Xn+i (a single new variable);
– add the clauses Xi ∨Xn+i and ¬Xi ∨ ¬Xn+i to capture ¬Xi ⇐⇒ Xn+i.
Thus, the updated formula is φ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm ∧Cm+1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm+n ∧Dm+n+1 ∧ · · · ∧Dm+2n,
where C1, . . . , Cm are the original m clauses with negated literals substituted by new variables and
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Cm+i is the clause Xi ∨Xn+i and Dm+n+i is the clause ¬Xi ∨¬Xn+i. Corresponding
to the above formula φ, we will construct an instance G,P whose high-level picture is shown in
Fig. 7.
s u0 v0 u1 v1 um+2n−1
vm+2n−1 um+2n
vm+2n t
1 2 1 1 4 1 1 3 1 1 2 1
2
Z1,1
1
3 Z1,2 2
4
Z1,3
3
1
Zm+2n,1
2
2
Zm+2n,2
3
Fig. 7. The high-level picture of the instance G,P.
G is the series composition of an edge (s, u0), a gadget for each clause i that starts with node
vi−1 and ends with node ui, and finally, an edge (vm+2n, t). The gadget corresponding to clause i
contains the parallel composition of disjoint gadgets Zi,j for each literal j in clause i. Note that
gadgets Zi,j associated with positive literals (so i ≤ m+ n) are different from those associated with
negated literals (here i ≥ m+ n+ 1).
For a variable x, we use ai, bi, a′i, b′i to denote the 4 vertices in the gadget of x in Ci and
ck, dk, c
′
k, d
′
k to denote the 4 vertices in the gadget of ¬x in Dk. The edge (ai, dk) will be called
a consistency edge. This connects the gadget of a positive literal to the (unique) corresponding neg-
ative literal (see Fig. 8). Definitions of preference lists are given in Section 4.1. Here, we explain the
main steps of the proof. Define F := {(ui, vi) : 0 ≤ i ≤ m+ 2n} to be the set of basic edges.
vi−1 ai bi ui vk−1 ck dk uk
b′i a
′
i d
′
k c
′
k
2 3 3 1 1 3 (∞− 1) 21 2
12
1 ∞
12
4
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
2 2
Fig. 8. Suppose x occurs in clause Ci (gadget on the left) and ¬x occurs in clause Dk (gadget on the right).
The rank ∞ on the edge (dk, ck) denotes that ck is dk’s last choice neighbor and the rank ∞− 1 on the edge
(dk, uk) denotes that uk is dk’s last but one choice neighbor.
Lemma 4. Let S be any stable matching in G,P. Then
1. S leaves s, t unmatched, F ⊆ S, and S contains no consistency edge.
12
Also, for every variable x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}, we have:
2. From the gadget of ¬x, either (i) (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k) ∈ S or (ii) (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) ∈ S.
— If (i) happens, we say that the gadget is in true state, else that it is in false state.
3. From a gadget of x in, say, the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i) (ai, b′i), (a′i, bi) or
(ii) (ai, bi), (a′i, b′i) is in S.
— If (i) happens, we say that the gadget is in true state, else that it is in false state.
4. If the gadget of ¬x is in true state then all the gadgets of x are in false state.
Conversely, any matching S of G that satisfies 1-4 above is stable.
Lemma 4 implies that each stable matching can be mapped to a true/false assignment as follows:
– For each x, if the gadget of ¬x is in true state, then set x = false, else set x = true.
Conversely, for any true/false assignment A to the variables in φ, we define an associated matching
MA as follows. First, include all basic edges in MA. For any x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}:
– If x = true then set all gadgets corresponding to x in true state, and the gadget corresponding
to ¬x in false state. Thus the dotted red edges (see Fig. 8) from all these gadgets get added to
MA.
– Otherwise, set all gadgets corresponding to x in false state and the gadget corresponding to ¬x
in true state. Thus the dashed blue edges (see Fig. 8) from all these gadgets get added to MA.
Lemma 4 implies that MA is stable. The next fact concludes the reduction.
Lemma 5. Let S be a stable matching in G,P. If there is an augmenting path ρ in GS, then ρ goes
from s to t, does not use any consistency edge, and passes, in each clause, in exactly one gadget,
which is in true state. In particular, the assignment corresponding to S is feasible. Conversely, if A
is a feasible assignment, in each clause i there is a gadget Zi,ji in true state, and there exists an
augmenting path in GS that passes through Zi,ji for all i.
In the rest of the section, we give the missing details from the construction, and prove Lemma 4
and Lemma 5.
4.1 The preference lists
The gadgets corresponding to an occurrence of x in the i-th clause and the occurrence of ¬x are
given in Fig. 8. Let Dk be the clause that contains the unique occurrence of ¬x in the transformed
formula φ.
Note that the labels of vertices ai, bi, a′i, b′i should depend on x; however, for the sake of readability,
we omit the dependency on x, since it is always clear from the context. Similarly for the labels of
vertices ck, dk, c′k, d′k.
We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget of x in the clause Ci.
ai : bi  dk  vi−1  b′i a′i : b′i  bi
bi : a′i  ai  ui b′i : ai  a′i
We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget of ¬x.
ck : dk  d′k  vk−1 c′k : d′k  dk
dk : c′k  ai  aj  · · ·  uk  ck d′k : ck  c′k
Here ai, aj , . . . are the occurrences of the a-vertex in all the gadgets corresponding to literal x in
the formula φ. That is, the literal x occurs in clauses i, j, . . . The order among the vertices ai, aj , . . .
in dk’s preference list does not matter.
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We now describe the preference lists of vertices ui and vi. The preference list of u0 is v0  s
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ n, the preference list of ui is as given on the left (these correspond to positive
clauses Ci) and for m+ n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ 2n, the preference list of ui is as given on the right (these
correspond to negative clauses Di):
ui : bi1  bi2  bi3  vi or ui : vi  di1  di2,
where bij (similarly, dij) is the b-vertex (resp., d-vertex) that appears in the gadget corresponding
to the j-th literal in the i-th clause. If the i-th clause (a positive one) consists of only 2 literals then
there is no bi3 here. The vertex vi is underlined.
The preference list of vm+2n is um+2n  t and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n, the preference list of vi−1 is
as given on the left (these correspond to positive clauses Ci) and for m + n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n, the
preference list of vi−1 is as given on the right (these correspond to negative clauses Di):
vi−1 : ui−1  ai1  ai2  ai3 or vi−1 : ci1  ci2  ui−1,
where aij (similarly, cij) is the a-vertex (resp., c-vertex) that appears in the gadget corresponding
to the j-th literal in the i-th clause. If the i-th clause (a positive one) consists of only 2 literals then
there is no ai3 here. The vertex ui−1 is underlined.
4.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We first derive some useful properties. Let S be the matching given by the union of the basic set
and the pair of dashed blue edges from the gadget of every literal. One easily checks that S is stable.
Thus s and t are unstable vertices, i.e., they remain unmatched in any stable matching. Suppose an
edge e is labeled (−,−) with respect to some stable matching. It is an easy fact [14] that e is an
unstable edge, i.e., no stable matching contains e. The following lemma is based on this fact.
Lemma 6. Let S be any stable matching in G,P. Then (i) S does not contain any consistency edge
and (ii) S is a superset of the basic set.
Proof. Consider the matching N given by the union of the basic set, the pair of dashed blue edges
from the gadget of every positive literal, and the pair of dotted red edges from the gadget of every
negative literal. It is easy to see that N is a stable matching. Every consistency edge is labeled (−,−)
with respect to N . Thus every consistency edge is unstable, proving (i).
Observe that every edge (vi−1, ai) is labeled (−,−) with respect to N . Similarly, every edge
(dk, uk) is also labeled (−,−) with respect to N . Thus no stable matching can contain these edges.
Recall that all the u-vertices and v-vertices are stable, so this immediately implies that vi−1 is
matched to ui−1 for all i ≤ m+ n and uk is matched vk for all k ≥ m+ n+ 1. Also recall that the
4 vertices in each literal gadget are stable. This implies um+n and vm+n are also matched to each
other in every stable matching, proving (ii). uunionsq
We can now conclude the proof of Lemma 4. Let S be any stable matching in G. Statement 1
follows from Lemma 6. Statements 2 and 3 are shown by statement 1 and stability. As for statement 4,
if the dashed blue pair of edges from ¬x’s gadget is included in S then the stability of S implies that S
has to contain the dashed blue pair of edges from every gadget of x—otherwise some consistency edge
would be a blocking edge to S. Finally, it is easy to see that any matching that satisfies statements
1-4 is stable.
4.3 Proof of Lemma 5
We first show the second part of Lemma 5. Let S be a stable matching of G. If there is a gadget in
true state in each clause, then an M -augmenting path starting at s and ending at t in GM is easily
constructed as follows. First, take edge (s, u0), then all edges (ui, vi) and:
– for each clause Ci with gadget Z set to true, edges (vi−1, ai), (ai, b′i), (b′i, a′i), (a′i, bi), (bi, ui);
14
– for each clause Dk with gadget Z set to true, edges (vk−1, ck), (ck, dk), (dk, uk).
Last, take edge (vm+2n, t). In order to prove the other direction, we start with some auxiliary facts.
Claim 3 All popular matchings in G have the same size and match the same set of vertices. In
particular, they leave unmatched only s and t.
Proof. Consider the matching M given by the union of the basic set with the pair of dashed blue
edges from the gadget of every literal. Note that M is a stable matching in G. We claim that M
is also a dominant matching in G. Since a dominant (resp. stable) matching is a popular matching
of maximum (resp. minimum) size, the first claim follows. The second is then implied by Lemma 1.
Consider the edge (v0, a1): this is labeled (−,−) with respect to M since both v0 and a1 prefer their
partners in M to each other. Thus there is no s-t path in the graph GM . As s and t are the only
unmatched vertices, there is no M -augmenting path in GM . So M is a dominant matching in G by
Theorem 2. uunionsq
Claim 4 Let S be a stable matching in G and ρ an augmenting path in GS. Then ρ goes from s to
t and does not use any consistency edge.
Proof. By Claim 3, stable matchings in G leave only 2 vertices unmatched: these are s and t. So ρ
must go from s to t. Recall that consistency edges cannot be included in S, see Lemma 4. By parity
reasons, traversing ρ from s to t, a consistency edge can only occur in ρ if it leads ρ back to an
earlier clause. That is, a consistency edge (ai, dk) has to be traversed in ρ in the direction dk → ai.
Let e = (dk, ai) be the first consistency edge traversed in ρ. Observe that ρ cannot reach t, because
nodes vi−1 and ui must have already been traversed by ρ. Hence, consistency edges cannot appear
in ρ. uunionsq
We can now conclude the proof of Lemma 5. Assume that there is an augmenting path ρ in GS ,
starting at s and terminating at t. Because of Claim 5, ρ goes from s to t, traverses all clauses, and
for each clause i, there is a path in Gφ,S between vi−1 and ui. The literal whose gadget provides
this vi−1 → ui path is set to true and thus the i-th clause is satisfied. As this holds for each i, this
means that φ has a satisfying assignment.
4.4 Max-size popular matchings
A non-dominant popular matching trivially exists if the size of a stable matching differs from the size
of a dominant matching in an instance. Our next result is tailored for such instances. We will now
show that it is NP-hard to decide if G,P admits a max-size popular matching that is not dominant.
Problem 3 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is a non-dominant matching among max-size popular matchings in G.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we will transform it as described earlier and build the graph Gφ. Recall
that all popular matchings in Gφ have the same size. We proved in Theorem 5 that it is NP-hard
to decide if Gφ admits a popular matching that is not dominant. Consider the graph H = Gφ ∪ ρ
where ρ is the path 〈p0, q0, p1, q1〉 with p1 and q0 being each other’s top choices. There are no edges
between a vertex in ρ and a vertex in Gφ. A max-size popular matching in H consists of the pair of
edges (p0, q0), (p1, q1), and a popular matching in Gφ.
Hence a max-size popular matching in H that is not dominant consists of (p0, q0), (p1, q1), and a
popular matching in Gφ that is non-dominant. Thus the desired result immediately follows.
Theorem 6. Given G = (A ∪ B,E) and P where in P, every vertex has a strict ranking over its
neighbors, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a max-size popular matching that is not dominant.
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5 Hardness of finding a stable matching that is dominant and
consequences for popular matchings
Given G = (A ∪ B,E) and a set of strictly ordered lists P, we first consider here the problem of
deciding if G admits a matching that is both stable and dominant.
Problem 4 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is a stable matching in G that is also dominant.
In instances where all popular matchings have the same size, such a matching M is desirable
as there are no blocking edges with respect to M ; moreover, M defeats any larger matching in a
head-to-head election.
In Section 5.1, we show that the above problem is NP-complete. We will then use this hardness
to show the NP-completeness of deciding if G admits a min-size popular matching that is unstable
and also to give a short proof of NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem.
5.1 Finding a matching that is both stable and dominant
We know from Theorem 2 that Problem 4 is equivalent to the problem of deciding if there exists a
stable matching M such that M has no augmenting path in GM . We will show a simple reduction
from 3SAT to this stable matching problem. Note that the graph G here (and hence the reduction)
is different from the instance given in Section 4. Given a 3SAT formula φ, we will transform φ as
done in Section 4 so that there is exactly one occurrence of ¬x in φ for every variable x.
Corresponding to the above formula φ, we will construct an instance G,P whose high-level picture
is shown in Fig. 9. There are two “unwanted” vertices s, t along with u`i , v`i for every clause ` in φ,
where i is the number of literals in clause `, along with one gadget for each literal in every clause.
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Fig. 9. The high-level picture of the gadgets corresponding to clauses ` with three literals, and `′ with two
negated literals in the instance G,P. The vertices s and t are common to all clauses.
In Fig. 9, Z`j is the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal of clause `, where each clause has
2 or 3 literals. As before, we have a separate gadget for every occurrence of each literal. That is,
there is a separate gadget for each occurrence of x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n} in φ and another gadget for the
unique occurrence of ¬x in φ.
As done in Section 4, vertices from a gadget corresponding to x are denoted by ai, a′i, bi, b′i, while
vertices from a gadget corresponding to ¬x are denoted by ck, c′k, dk, d′k; however adjacency lists and
preferences are different here, see again Fig 9. As before, we have a consistency edge between x’s
gadget and ¬x’s gadget: this is now between the b-vertex of x’s gadget and c-vertex of ¬x’s gadget.
Again, we postpone the definition of preference lists, and instead state the following lemma,
analogous to Lemma 4. The proof of Lemma 7 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4 and hence
omitted.
Lemma 7. Let S be any stable matching in G,P. Then
1. S leaves s and t unmatched and it does not contain any consistency edge, while the edges (u`i , v`i )
for all clauses ` and indices i are in S.
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Fig. 10. Suppose x occurs as the first literal in the i-th clause and ¬x occurs as the second literal in the
k-th clause. For convenience, we use a1, b1, a′1, b′1 to denote the 4 vertices in this gadget of x and c2, d2, c′2, d′2
to denote the 4 vertices in the gadget of ¬x. As before, ∞ and ∞− 1 denote last choice neighbor and last
but one choice neighbor, respectively.
Also, for every variable x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}, we have:
2. From the gadget of ¬x, either the pair (i) (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k) or (ii) (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) is in S.
— If (i) happens, we say that the gadget is in false state, else that it is in true state.
3. From a gadget of x, say, its gadget in the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i) (ai, bi), (a′i, b′i)
or (ii) (ai, b′i), (a′i, bi) is in S.
— If (i) happens, we say that the gadget is in true state, else that it is in false state.
4. If the gadget of ¬x is in true state then all the gadgets of x are in false state.
Conversely, any matching S of G that satisfies 1-4 above is stable.
Corresponding to any stable matching M , define a true/false assignment AM as follows:
– If the dashed blue pair (ck, dk) and (c′k, d′k) from ¬x’s gadget belongs to M then AM sets x to
true; else AM sets x to false.
Conversely, for any true/false assignment A to the variables in φ, we define an associated matching
MA as follows. For any x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}:
– If x = true, then set every gadget corresponding to x in true state, and the gadget corresponding
to ¬x in false state. Thus the dashed blue edges (see Fig. 10) from all these gadgets get added
to MA.
– Otherwise, set every gadget corresponding to x in false state, and the gadget corresponding to
¬x in true state. Thus the dotted red edges (see Fig. 10) from all these gadgets get added to MA.
Finally, include the edges (u`i , v`i ) for all ` and i. Using Lemma 7, it is easy to see that MA is a stable
matching.
Our goal is to show that φ is satisfiable if and only if G has a stable matching S without an
S-augmenting path in GS . This is achieved by the following lemma, whose proof is given at the end
of this section.
Lemma 8. If there is a stable matching M such that GM has no augmenting path, then AM satisfies
φ. Conversely, if there exists a satisfiable assignment A, then there is no augmenting path with respect
to MA in GMA .
We can therefore conclude the following.
Theorem 7. Given G = (A ∪B,E),P, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a matching that is
both stable and dominant.
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Preference lists We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices a1, b1, a′1, b′1 in the gadget
of x in the i-th clause. We assume x to be the first literal in this clause. Note that the consistency
edge now exists between the b-vertex in x’s gadget and the c-vertex in ¬x’s gadget (see Fig. 10).
a1 : b1  vi0  b′1 a′1 : b′1  b1
b1 : a′1  ck  a1  ui1 b′1 : a1  a′1
We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices c2, d2, c′2, d′2 in the gadget of ¬x (see Fig. 10).
We assume ¬x to be the second literal in this clause (let this be the k-th clause).
c2 : d2  bi  bj  · · ·  d′2  vk1 c′2 : d′2  d2
d2 : c′2  uk2  c2 d′2 : c2  c′2
Here bi, bj , . . . are the occurrences of the b-vertex in all the gadgets corresponding to literal x in
the formula φ. The order among these vertices in c2’s preference list is not important.
We now describe the preference lists of vertices u`i and v`i for 0 ≤ i ≤ r in clause `, where r ∈ {2, 3}
is the number of literals in this clause. The preference list of u`0 is v`0  s and the preference list of
v`r is u`r  t.
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ r and let aj , bj , a′j , b′j be the 4 vertices in the gadget of the j-th literal in this clause.
The preference list of u`j is as given on the left (resp. right) for positive (resp. negative) clauses.
u`j : bj  v`j or u`j : v`j  dj .
The preference list of v`j−1 is as given on the left (resp. right) for positive (resp. negative) clauses.
v`j−1 : u`j−1  aj or v`j−1 : cj  u`j−1.
Observe that s and t are the last choices for each of their neighbors. The preferences of s and t
are not relevant and it is easy to see the following.
Claim 5 Both s and t are unstable vertices.
Proof of Lemma 8 Take any stable matching M . Suppose AM does not satisfy, say, the r-th
clause. We show that GM has an augmenting path with respect to M , concluding the proof of one
direction. Note that all gadgets in the r-th clause are in false state in M . Construct the augmenting
path in GM follows:
– Let the r-th clause be a positive clause x∨ y∨ z. Let a1, b1, a′1, b′1 be the 4 vertices in x’s gadget,
a2, b2, a
′
2, b
′
2 be the 4 vertices in y’s gadget, and a3, b3, a′3, b′3 be the 4 vertices in z’s gadget. Thus
we have the following augmenting path with respect to M :
s−(ur0, vr0)−(a1, b′1)−(a′1, b1)−(ur1, vr1)−(a2, b′2)−(a′2, b2)−(ur2, vr2)−(a3, b′3)−(a′3, b3)−(ur3, vr3)−t.
– Let the r-th clause be a negative clause ¬x∨¬y. So both x and y are set to true and M contains
the dashed blue pair of edges from ¬x’s gadget and also from ¬y’s gadget.
Let c1, d1, c′1, d′1 be the 4 vertices in ¬x’s gadget and let c2, d2, c′2, d′2 be the 4 vertices in ¬y’s
gadget. Thus we have the following augmenting path with respect to M :
s− (ur0, vr0)− (c1, d1)− (ur1, vr1)− (c2, d2)− (ur2, vr2)− t.
Conversely, assume that φ has a satisfiable assignment A. We show that there is no MA-
augmenting path in GMA . Let ` be any positive clause. Suppose A sets the j-th literal in this
clause to true. Let aj , bj , a′j , b′j be the 4 vertices in the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal.
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So (aj , bj) ∈ MA and hence there is no edge (v`j−1, aj) in GMA . Thus there is no alternating path
between s and t such that all the intermediate vertices on this path correspond to the `-th clause.
However there are consistency edges jumping across clauses—so there may be an MA-augmenting
path that begins with vertices corresponding to the `-th clause and then uses a consistency edge.
Let ρ be an MA-alternating path in GMA with s as an endpoint and let (s, u`0) be the first edge in ρ.
So the prefix of ρ consists of vertices that belong to the `-th clause.
Let bi be the last vertex of the `-th clause in this prefix of ρ. Let ai, bi, a′i, b′i be the 4 vertices
in the gadget of bi (let this correspond to variable x) in the `-th clause. Observe that (ai, b′i) and
(a′i, bi) are in MA—otherwise bi is not reachable from u`0 in GMA via a path of vertices in the `-th
clause.
Assume the consistency edge (bi, ck) belongs to ρ, where ck is a vertex in the gadget of ¬x. Let
ck, dk, c
′
k, d
′
k be the vertices in the gadget of ¬x and suppose this literal occurs in the r-th clause.
Since the dotted red pair in x’s gadget in the `-th clause is in MA, the dotted red pair (ck, d′k)
and (c′k, dk) has to be in MA. Since c′k and d′k are degree 2 vertices, ρ has to contain the subpath
ck − d′k − c′k − dk. However ρ is now stuck at dk in the graph GMA . The path cannot go back to ck.
There is no edge between dk and urk in GMA since this is a (−,−) edge as both dk and urk prefer
their respective partners in MA to each other. Thus the alternating path ρ has to terminate at dk.
The case when ` is a negative clause is even simpler since in this case ρ cannot leave the vertices
of the `-th clause using a consistency edge. We know that the assignment A sets some literal in the
`-th clause to true: let this be the k-th literal, so (c′k, dk) ∈ MA and hence there is no edge (dk, u`k)
in GMA . Thus there is no MA-augmenting path in GMA in this case also, concluding the proof.
5.2 Min-size popular matchings
In this section we investigate the counterpart of Theorem 6, i.e., the complexity of determining if
G = (A ∪B,E) admits a min-size popular matching that is not stable.
Problem 5 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is an unstable matching among min-size popular matchings in G.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform it as described in Section 4 and build the graph G as
described in Section 5.1. We now augment the bipartite graph G into bipartite graph H as follows:
– Add a new vertex w, which is adjacent to each d′-vertex in ¬x’s gadget for every variable
x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}.
– Add a square 〈t, t′, r′, r〉 at the t-end of the graph (see Fig. 11), where t′, r′, r are new vertices.
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Fig. 11. We add a square 〈t, t′, r′, r〉 at the end of the graph G, and a vertex w as shown in the figure above.
Recall that each s-t path in G corresponds to a clause in φ.
The preference lists of the vertices in {r, r′, t′, t} are as follows:
r : r′  t r′ : r  t′ t′ : r′  t t : · · ·  r  t′.
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Recall that the vertex t is adjacent to the last v`-vertex in every clause gadget `. The vertex t prefers
all its v-neighbors (the order among these is not important) to its neighbors in the square which are
r and t′ and t prefers r to t′.
Regarding the vertex w, this vertex is the last choice for all its neighbors and w’s preference
list is some permutation of its neighbors (the order among these neighbors is not important). This
finishes the description of the graph H. We denote the collection of all preference lists again by P.
The proof of Lemma 9 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 9. Let S be any stable matching in H,P. Then S contains the edges (u`i , v`i ) for all clauses
` and all i and the pair of edges (r, r′), (t, t′). Moreover, S does not contain any consistency edge.
Corollary 1. For any stable matching S in H,P and any variable x ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}, we have:
1. From the gadget of ¬x, either the pair (i) (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k) or (ii) (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) is in S.
2. From a gadget of x, say its gadget in the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i) (ai, bi), (a′i, b′i)
or (ii) (ai, b′i), (a′i, bi) is in S.
It follows from Lemma 9 and Corollary 1 that a stable matching in H matches all vertices
except s and w. A max-size popular matching in H is a perfect matching: it includes the edges
(s, u`0), (v`0, ck), (d′k, w), (dk, c′k) for some negative clause `. We now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 8. H,P admits an unstable min-size popular matching if and only if G admits a stable
matching that is dominant.
Proof. Suppose G admits a stable matching N that is also dominant. We claim that M = N ∪
{(r, t), (r′, t′)} is a popular matching in H. Note that there is a blocking edge (r, r′) with respect
to M . Since M matches exactly the stable vertices, this would make M an unstable min-size popular
matching.
Recall Theorem 1 (from Section 2) that characterizes popular matchings. We will now show that
the matching M satisfies the three sufficient conditions for popularity as given in Theorem 1. Note
that (r, r′) is the only blocking edge with respect to M . Thus property (ii) from Theorem 1 obviously
holds. Property (i) holds since the edge (t, t′) is labeled (−,−) with respect to M . Thus there is no
alternating cycle in HM with the edge (r, r′). We will now show property (iii) also holds in HM ,
thus M is a popular matching in H.
There are two unmatched vertices in M : s and w. We need to check that the edge (r, r′) is not
reachable via an M -alternating path from either s or w in HM . Since the matching N is dominant
in G, there is no M -alternating path between s and t in HM . Thus the blocking edge (r, r′) is not
reachable from s by an M -alternating path in HM .
Consider the vertex w and any of its neighbors, say d′k (see Fig. 10). We know that N includes
either the dotted red pair of edges (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) or the dashed blue pair of edges (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k).
In both cases, the blocking edge (r, r′) is not reachable in HM by an M -alternating path with (w, d′k)
as a starting edge. This proves one side of the reduction.
We will now show the converse. Let M be a min-size popular matching in H that is unstable.
Since M is a min-size popular matching, the set of vertices matched in M is the set of stable vertices.
Consider the edges (v`i−1, ai), (dk, u`k), and (bi, ck) for any `, i, and k. For each of those edges, there
is a stable matching in G (and thus in H) where all these edges are labeled (−,−) (see the proof
of Lemma 4). Thus these edges are slack6 with respect to a popular matching and its witness, i.e. 0
here—so they are unpopular edges (see Section 2). Hence M has to contain the edges (u`i , v`i ) for all
clauses ` and all i.
The 4 vertices in a literal gadget are stable, hence matched among themselves in M (since they
must all be matched, and we excluded other edges incident to them), i.e., either the dotted red pair
or the dashed blue pair from each literal gadget belongs to M . Also, the consistency edge cannot
be a blocking edge to M as this would make a blocking edge reachable via an M -alternating path in
HM from the unmatched vertex w, a contradiction to M ’s popularity in H (by Theorem 1).
6 An edge (x, y) is slack with respect to a popular matching N and its witness α if αx + αy > wtN (x, y).
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Since M is unstable, there is a blocking edge with respect to M . The only possibility is from
within the square 〈r, r′, t′, t〉. Thus M has to contain the pair of edges (r, t) and (r′, t′): this makes
(r, r′) a blocking edge with respect to M . Consider the matching N = M \ {(r, t), (r′, t′)}. We have
already argued that N is a stable matching in G.
Suppose N is not dominant in G. Then there is an N -alternating path between s and t in GN .
Thus in the graph HM , there is an M -alternating path from the unmatched vertex s to the blocking
edge (r, r′). This contradicts the popularity of M in H by Theorem 1. Hence N is a dominant
matching in G. uunionsq
We proved in Section 5.1 that the problem of deciding if G admits a stable matching that is
dominant is NP-hard. Thus we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Given G = (A ∪ B,E) and P, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a min-size
popular matching that is not stable.
Our graph H is such that every popular matching here has size either n/2 or n/2− 1, where n is
the number of vertices in H. All popular matchings of size n/2 are dominant since they are perfect
matchings. Thus a popular matching M in H is neither stable nor dominant if and only if M is an
unstable popular matching of size n/2 − 1, i.e., M is an unstable min-size popular matching in H.
So we have shown a new and simple proof of NP-hardness of the problem of deciding if a marriage
instance admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant.
5.3 A simple proof of NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem
We know that the popular roommates problem is NP-hard [8, 13]. Here we adapt the hardness
reduction given in Section 5.1 to show a short and simple proof of hardness of this problem. We first
mention some useful structural results from Section 2 that extend to the roommates case.
The first is the Rural Hospitals Theorem, see [14, Theorem 4.5.2]). That is, if H = (V,E) admits
stable matchings, then all stable matchings in H have to match the same subset of vertices. Another
useful property is that if an edge e is labeled (−,−) with respect to a stable matching in H then
no popular matching in H can include e [22]. Last, we recall that the characterization of popular
matchings given in Theorem 1 also holds when G is non-bipartite.
Problem 6 Input: A (non-bipartite) graph H = (V,E) with strict preference lists.
Decide: If there is a popular matching in H.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform it as described in Section 4 and build the graph G as
described in Section 5.1. We now augment the bipartite graph G into a non-bipartite graph H,
depicted in Fig. 12 as follows:
– Add edges between s and the d′-vertex in ¬x’s gadget for every variable x.
– At the other end of the graph G, add an edge (t, r) along with a triangle 〈r, r′, r′′〉, where r, r′, r′′
are new vertices.
The preference lists of the vertices in {r, r′, r′′, t} are as follows:
r : r′  r′′  t r′ : r′′  r r′′ : r  r′ t : · · ·  r.
The vertex t is adjacent to the last v`-vertex in every clause gadget `. The vertex t prefers all its
v-neighbors (the order among these is not important) to r. We denote the collection of all preference
lists again by P.
The vertex s is the last choice neighbor for all its neighbors. The preference list of s is not
relevant. Recall the vertex w used in Section 5.2: now we have merged the vertices s and w. This
creates odd cycles, which is allowed here since the graph H is non-bipartite.
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Fig. 12. We add a new triangle 〈r, r′, r′′〉 to t, and connect s with all d′ vertices as shown in the figure above.
Popular matchings in H Let M be a popular matching in H. Observe that M has to match r, r′,
and r′′ since each of these vertices is a top choice neighbor for some vertex. If one of these vertices
is left unmatched in M then there would be a blocking edge incident to an unmatched vertex, a
contradiction to its popularity (see Theorem 1, condition (iii)). Since t is the only outside neighbor
of r, r′, r′′, the matching M has to contain the pair of edges (t, r), (r′, r′′). Note that the edge (r, r′′)
blocks M .
Let H∗ = H \ {t, r, r′, r′′}. Consider the matching N = M \ {(t, r), (r′, r′′)} in H∗. Since M is
popular in H, the matching N has to be popular in H∗. We claim N has to match all vertices in H∗
except s. This is because H∗ admits a stable matching: consider S = ∪`,i{(u`i , v`i )} ∪ {dashed blue
edges in every literal gadget}—this is a stable matching in H∗. We know that N has to match all
stable vertices [16]. Since the number of vertices in H∗ is odd, the vertex s is left unmatched in N .
Consider any consistency edge. We claim this is an unpopular edge in H∗. This is because there
is a stable matching in H∗ where this edge is labeled (−,−) (see the proof of Lemma 4), hence this
edge cannot be used in any popular matching in H∗ [22]. Since all vertices in H∗ except s have to
be matched in N , the following 3 observations hold:
1. N contains the edges (u`i , v`i ) for all clauses ` and all i.
2. From the gadget of ¬x, either the pair (i) (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k) or (ii) (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) is in N .
3. From a gadget of x, say, its gadget in the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i) (ai, bi), (a′i, b′i)
or (ii) (ai, b′i), (a′i, bi) is in N .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10, whose proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.
Theorem 10. H,P admits a popular matching if and only if G admits a stable matching that is
dominant.
Proof. Suppose G admits a stable matching S that is also dominant. We claim that M = S ∪
{(t, r), (r′, r′′)} is a popular matching in H. We will again use Theorem 1 to prove the popularity of
M in H. There is exactly one blocking edge with respect to M : this is the edge (r, r′′).
Observe that properties (i) and (ii) from Theorem 1 are easily seen to hold. We will now show
that property (iii) from Theorem 1 also holds. We need to check that the edge (r, r′′) is not reachable
via an M -alternating path from s in HM .
Since the matching S is dominant in G, there is no S-alternating path between s and t in GS .
Thus the blocking edge (r, r′′) is not reachable from s by an M -alternating path in GM . We now need
to show that the blocking edge (r, r′′) is not reachable from s by an M -alternating path in HM , i.e.,
when the first edge of the alternating path is (s, d′k) for some d′k. We know that M includes either
the dotted red pair of edges (ck, d′k), (c′k, dk) or the dashed blue pair of edges (ck, dk), (c′k, d′k) from
this gadget. In both cases, it can be checked that the blocking edge (r, r′) is not reachable in HM
by an M -alternating path with (s, d′k) as the starting edge. This proves one side of the reduction.
We will now show the converse. Suppose H admits a popular matching M . We argued above
that the pair of edges (t, r) and (r′, r′′) is in M . Consider the matching N = M \ {(t, r), (r′, r′′)}.
We claim that N is a stable matching in G.
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From observations 1-3 given above, it follows that the only possibility of a blocking edge to N is
from a consistency edge. However a consistency edge cannot block N as this would make a blocking
edge reachable by an M -alternating path in HM from the unmatched vertex s and this contradicts
M ’s popularity (by Theorem 1).
We now claim that N is a dominant matching in G. Suppose not. Then there is an N -alternating
path between s and t in GN . Thus in the graph HM , there is an M -alternating path from the
unmatched vertex s to the blocking edge (r, r′′). This contradicts the popularity of M in H by
Theorem 1. Hence N is a dominant matching in G. uunionsq
We know that the problem of deciding if G admits a stable matching that is dominant is NP-hard.
This completes our new proof of the NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem. Observe that
every popular matching in H is a max-size matching (since only the vertex s is left unmatched),
hence every popular matching in H is dominant. Thus our reduction above also shows a simple proof
of NP-hardness of the dominant roommates problem.
Conclusions and an open problem We considered popular matching problems in a bipartite
graph G = (A ∪ B,E) with strict preferences. We showed a simple O(|E|2) algorithm for deciding
if there exists a popular matching in G that is not stable. An open problem is to improve the
running time of this algorithm. We showed that the problems of deciding if a bipartite graph admits
a stable matching that is (i) dominant, (ii) not dominant are NP-hard. These results imply many
new hardness results for popular matchings in bipartite graphs, including the hardness of finding
(1) a popular matching that is not dominant, (2) a min-size popular matching that is not stable,
and (3) a max-size popular matching that is not dominant.
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